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AFRICAN POLITICAL MOBILISATION IN BRAKPAN IN THE 1950s
Hilary Sapire
With the notable exception of Tom Lodge's recent work1, much of the literature
which addresses i tself to the turbulent decade of African politics of the
1950s focuses almost exclusively on formal political organisations and their
national leaders2. Rarely do the roles and consciousness of local political
figures and the "led" or rank and file come into view. Thn foreground is
invariably occupied by national middle class African figures planning, forming
alliances, overhauling the structures of their organisations and directing
mass activity. Beyond this phalanx, we can barely make out the blurred and
somewhat undifferentiated feature of the urban masses. Occasionally their
profiles are illuminated in a "flashpoint" of class conflict or their actions
may momentarily be sighted in a flare-up of rioting during one of the major
political campaigns of the decade. But all too rarely are these moments of
resistance situated in their immediate terrain. This absence of sensitivity
to the sociology and social history of urban African communities of the 1950s
is especially glaring, as it was in this decade that urban Afr Leans wre
subjected to unprecedented measures of social restructuring and social
engineering with the implementation of apartheid. Similar criticisms can be
levelled at the writings of Marxist scholars who are concerned with the social
composition and changing ideological discourse of the major political
organisation of the period, the ANC3. Like the institutional historians, they
fail to locate the growth of political organisations and the development nf a
mass-based politics within the changing sociological realties of South
Africa's towns and ci ties, and thereby to probe their assumptions about the
history of urban African societies and the class bases of political movements.
The institutional focus has also meant that a variety of urban constituencies,
idioms of protest, ideologies and forms of consciousness which fed into the
overall mass political culture of the decade rarely surfaces, while the social
groupings which were neither reflected in nor embraced by the ANC, remain
invisible in most ^accounts. 4 T h e crucial role that "dummy" o r
"collaborationist" institutions, such as the Location Advisory Board could,
and sometimes did play in mobilising African communities around th*3 ANC
programmes, for example, has been little understood. Conversely, although
much d i rect acti on occurred outs i de. the scope of formal organ i sat ion, many
urban constituencies in which the ANC failed to strike strong roots, have been
obscured CM.1 ignored altogether. The history of urhan squatter movements in
the 1950s is thus almost unknown. Finally, the institutional bias of
historians has meant that the immense regional variations in political
cultures and styles of protest h a v e not been explained a 11 d t h a t t it e
notoriously uneven responses to the AiVC campaigns of the decade have not h^en
adequately understood. This paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive
corrective but it is concerned, through the Brakpan case to point to aspects
of urban social history which may enhance our understanding of the complexity
and variability of black political mobilisation in the 19."i0s. It emphasises
the value of examining the local permutations in the unfolding of the huge
processes of i ndnstr i al i sat, i on and At r i can urban i sat i on and i n the mini ic ipa 1
administration of -U'ric.ni communities for understanding popular responses to
poljtioa] organisation in the decade. Thus, this paper demonstrates; Hn1
laggard inriimtrin 1 growth in Rrakpan, the delayed implementation of ,-ipartheid
social en a" i nee v i rig and the pecu 1 i ar 1 y harsh adm i n i s t rat i on of" the "n.-i r i VP
location" had crucial implications for the social nature of poLitical
organisation and for the modes of resistance and protest employed.
In several respects, Brakpan of the 1950s was a typical East Rand town.
Fathered by gold, it s landscape was dominated by the mining dumps and
headgear of Brakpan Mines, State Mines and Vlakfontein Mine- Up until and
well into the 1950s, when the mines began to show signs of exhaustion, the
bulk of the white male population were employed on the mines and lived with
their families in the neatly laid-out rows of brick houses in the tuwn;s three
suburbs. The overwhelming majority of African inhabitants were also employed
by the mines, but were housed in the bleak compounds on the mining properties.
A diminutive industrial sector which was almost entirely subservient to the
needs of the gold mining industry and an equally small commercial sector had
made their appearances by World War 1. Together with domestic service and
intermittent building projects during growth-spurts of the town, these sectors
provided employment to the permanently urbanised African population, which was
quarantined from "white" Brakpan in the municipal location adjacent to the
town.5 Manufacturing and commerce, however, were comparatively insignificant
sectors and social forces in the town, especially when contrasted with those
of neighbouring East Rand towns. When the mines of Benoni, Boksburg, Springs
and Germ is ton began to show signs of mutability in the late 1930s, the
respective chambers of commerce and town councils had launched massive
programmes of secondary industrialisation to wean the towns from their extreme
dependency on mining. By the 1940s, as a result of these projects and the
spurt given by wartime import substitution policies, Benoni and Boksburg could
boast a dense concentration of heavy industry, while Germiston became an
important centre of light industry by the 1950s. By contrast, the vigour and
apparent longevity of the mines in the vicinity of Brakpan induced a sense of
complacency in the city fathers, and well into the 1960s, the Brakpan town
council showed little interest in diversifying the local economy. It was more
concerned with retaining the image of Brakpan as the East Rand's "garden
town", and by virtue of its prolific "State Mines", as its "jewel".0 Thus, by
the 1950s, although three industrial sites had been established, there were a
mere 25 industrial establishments, a relatively insignificant figure as the
following table demonstrates.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE TWO MAIN TYPES OF INDUSTRIES ON THE EAST RAND
ACCORDING TO THE 1957 INDUSTRIAL CENSUS
CHEMICAL
No. Employees
28 3 077
o ?
4 213
The absence of a so Lid industrial base in Brakpan had some important
consequences: it meant that like smaller Transvaal platteland towns, African
cleaners, servants, messengers, watchmen, shop assistants and municipal
labourers far outnumbered factory workers. As a result, trade unionism was tu
have a negligible impact on the political culture of the local African
populat ion. The limited labour needs of this industrially undeveloped town
had another sign.i f icance; it meant that in this period of rapid and intensive
African urbanisation on the V i twatersrancl. the local influx and social.
TOWN
Germ iston
Boksburg
Brakpan
Benoni
Springs
METAL
No.
114
41
14
53
41
Emolovees
14 903
7 955
1 183
7 755
•i 559
controls were to be considerably tighter than those of the larger neighbouring
tOMlS.
Yet, despite the vigilance of the local influx control officer and labour
bureaux, the size of the African population in Brakpan grew to a figure which
far exceeded the town's modest labour requirements. From a total figure of
58 000 Africans in the area in 1948 (36 000 on the mines, 10 000 in the
location and over 12 000 squatters on the peri-urban smallholdings)7 the total,
figure reached 64 000 by 1958. The ratio of between permanently urbanised
Africans and migrants had also begun to shift. As mining activities in
Brakpan and other East Rand towns began to wind down, the migrant population
dropped by G 000, while the number of permanently settled Africans L ivi ng i n
the locat ion increased by 2 000. By the middle years of the decade, I.lie
number of squatters on the surrounding smallholdings, farms and vacant; nun ing
land reached 22 000. s
Unlike the earlier surges of black immigration to the town in the 1920s and
19 30s when the majority of workseekers tended to originate in the "wlii t.e
farms" of the immediate agricultural hinterland (Heidelberg, the Reef farms of
Benoni, Springs and Nigel) and from the agricultural districts of Standerton
and Natal9, from the war years, more and more African newcomers tended to come
from the reserves and the protectorates. The damage inflicted upon rural
society by the intensification of migrancy contributed to a haeraorrhaging of
Africans from these regions. Increasingly, women began to move to the East
Rand on an individual basis to escape the grinding poverty and restrictive
patriarchal controls in these areas. Although there is no precise information
about the places of origin of the wave of women from the late 1930s, the
cumulative impression from the evidence is that a disproportionately large
amount of these women hailed from the overstocked and denuded areas of
Basutoland.l0 A significant proportion of women from areas other than the
reserves and protectorates also streamed into the East Rand towns in these
years. Simkins shows that the net inflow of women to the East Rand came
principally from the Transvaal, while the Manager of Non-European Affairs of
Brakpan commented that Ndebele women were pouring into the town at a rate
"which alarms me".11
While many of the male immigrants moved directly from the rural areas, a large
number of African men who insinuated themselves into the urban area in the
19 50s were ex-miners. Upon the completion of their contracts, or upon
retrenchment as the mines in the region began to close, many miners elected to
remain in the urban area, rather than return to rural slumdom. To the chagrin
of the local authority, few ex-miners reported to the labour bureaux for
placement in urban or agricultural employment. It was observed that the
estimated average of 150 men who reported to the bureaux each month,
represented a miniscule fraction of miners who remained in the urban area.
Not only did ex-miners fail to report to the bureaux, but it was discovered by
the municipality in the mid-1950s that several white residents engaged
"foreign natives" (ex-miners) as domestic servants, gardeners and agricultural
workers on the plots and farms without registering them with the
authorities.l2 The vast majority of newcomers in the 1950s migrated to the
poor Ly policed snial [holdings and farms on the outskirts of the town, and
entered into a varietv of tenant and employment relationships hitli whi t.e
smallholders. The smallholders directly benefitted from these relationships:
extortionate rentals extracted from African tenants went some way in
augmenting the rather meagre incomes earned by white miners and artisan
smalIholciers. Other Africans erected crude huts on vacant mining land and
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settled there in large clusters. These "squatters", both on the smallholdings
and on vacant mining ground had generally evaded municipal detection and
tended to lead clandestine, shadowy existences on the periphery of the urban
social order.
Other newcomers, gained employment in the town itself and accommodation in the
location through a range of stratagems. Because of the scarcity of jobs and
houses in the region, t li e acquisition of employment and municipal
accommodation was usually dependent upon the operation of "houseboy" networks.
Several informants explained that relatives or friends from their village of
birth had organised jobs for them. Having first secured employment, these
more fortunate newcomers claimed that their status as bona fide employees of
the town, entitled them to municipal accommodation.L3 For women, outside of
the oversubscribed domestic service sector, it was well nigh impossible to
secure employment. Many single women bypassed this problem by "canvassing"
amongst the single men of town and contracting hasty "marriages of
convenience", so earning the legal right to reside in the location.14
There were thus two black worlds in Brakpan: the sprawling settlements of
squatters on vacant land, farms and individual plots, few of whom were legally
enti tied to remain in the urban area, and the settled core of location
inhabitants, many of whom had lived there since its establishment in 1927.
Despite the regular interchange between them, the two communities were
remarkably discrete in character and enviced strikingly different trajectories
of struggle in the 1950s. The smallholding squatters generally resisted
extortion and exploitation by white landlords in a myriad of anarchic, almost
preindustrial gestures of protest (stock theft, veld fires and gang activity).
It was only for a brief moment, in 1953, that an act of organised, collective
protest was mounted by the squatters. In this year, in protest against mass
evictions of African tenants, a group of squatters, led by a formidable band
of women, invaded vacant municipal land and established an informal "emergency
camp" there. Vet once the municipality responded to their most immediate
demands by providing some housing for squatters and by bringing a halt to the
evictions, the militancy of squatters dissipated and the more individualistic,
often criminal modes of protest once again reasserted themselves. By
contrast, until the final years of the decade, the location was a highly
politicised region and an important base of the ANC. The responses to both
the ANC Defiance Campaign and Bantu Education Campaign of 1952 and 1955
respectively were tumultuous and dramatic. Because of the constraints of time
and space, it is on the formal political mobilisation in the location that the
remainder of this paper concentrates.
In order to understand the remarkable responsiveness of the Brakpan location
dwellers to the blandishments and programmes of ANC organisers in the 1950s,
three areas are examined in this paper. The first is the tradition of popular
radical ism which had been spawned during the subsistence struggles and
resistance against municipal controls during the war years which were
conducted under the leadership of rejuvenated tenant organisations and by the
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The ANC branch of the 1950s, was in
many ways, the legatee of the CPSA. It inherited much of its character and
style from that of the communists of the 1940s. Secondly, the implications of
the failure of the municipali ty to remove the location dwellers from the
"inner city" location and resettle it in a remotely situated, ethnically zoned
township in accordance with Verwoerdian dogma, until the 1960s, -ire examined.
The paper argues that the coherence and unanimity with which location dwellers
responded to the ANC campaigns, at Least in the early years of the decade, can
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partially be explained by the fact that this community was spared the
disruptive and traumatic ei'fects of Nationalist social engineering until the
1960s. Thirdly, the paper examines the conditions of life in the location
during the 1950s. The overwhelming and all-pervasive poverty, the endemic
unemployment, the instability of urban existence, the authori tar inn ahd
austere character of the location regime and deterioration of municipal
facilities - all ensured sustained high levels of discontent around
bread-and-butter issues. To a large extent, it was because of the ability of
local politicians to respond to the immediate, parochial grievances of the
residents and to relate these to the broader structures of oppression in South
African society that it was possible to fashion an effective protest movement
in Brakpan.
POPULAR RADICALISM AND THE RISE OF THE CPSA IN THE BKAKPAN LOCATION. 1939 -
1948
In contrast to the decade which preceded it, the Brakpan location was in a
state of constant ferment in the 1940s. Whereas a fundamentally
accommodationist and defensive popular culture had prevailed and inhibited
political organisation in the 1930s, the 1940s saw a dramatic rise of popular-
militancy and the emergence of the CPSA as the dominant political force in the
location. There were many reasons for this shift in popular consciousness,
one which was mirrored in several other towns during the war years. In this
period., rural impoverishment - interspersed with major droughts - combined
with the relaxation of pass controls and the local residential permit system
to produce a massive increase in the African population of the town. Not only
did this exacerbate the existing unemployment and associated social problems,
bu t it heightened the di re housing shortage in the area caused by wartime
shortages of building materials. During these years, prices soared, while
wages failed to register a demonstrable increase. Moreover, under the impact
of constant urbanisation, the quality of facilities and amenities in the
location rapidly deteriorated.
The location residents reacted to the hardships and privations of the early
war years in acts of spontaneous, and at times, anarchic protest. In response
to the hiking of bus fares in 1942, for example, angry crowds stoned the
municipal bus.15 Yet, unlike the previous decade, the location organisations,
the Advisory Board and Vigilance Association, were able to tap this discontent
and to shape it into a powerful social movement. Both organisations, which
had hitherto championed the narrow, sectional interests of traders, clerks,
interpreters and shop assistants, struck an accord with their more plebeian
location co-inhabitants by evincing a heightened sensitivity to the hardships
and struggles of the mass of location dwellers. The two organisations
spearheaded and co-ordinated a range of campaigns against food shortages,
inadequate education facilities and police raids. Both organisations were
also strident and shrill in their demands for the redress of the residents'
grievances.l6 Through the medium of regular and well-attended report-back
meetings in the location hall, a vigorous tradition of political
accountability was forged. At these meetings, the residents elected their own
cha. i i-persun, submitted their complaints to the Advisory Board members and
listened to Advisor} Board members1 reports on the progress of their
negotiations with the town council.17 While the Advisory Board enjoyed
i-fcogni Lion from the town counciI (the original aim behind the establishment
of the Board in 1927, had been Co siphon off middle class African political
trust rat ion and to create a body of Africans loyal r.o arid supportive of the
location Administration), tlu* Vigilance Association was constaiu.lv rebuffed by
the town counci1. The latter's history explains much of the council's
attitude: it had been conceived and created in 1931 as an "opposition party"
to the "traitors" of the Adv isory Board and had adopted a po 1 icy of
uncompromising criticism of the location regime as well as regularLy
challenging the legality of location regulations in the courts. In response,
the council simply refused to accord tlie Association the status of a
legitimate institution and to respond to any correspondence emanating fi/mii
this body. By the 1940s, despite their earlier history of conflict, and under
the influence of v>ider radicalising influences at play, the two bodies drew
closer together in a common commitment to challengin the arbitrary and petty
controls exerted over the lives of Brakpan's location dwellers. indeed, by
the early 1940s, the membership of both organisations tended to overlap.lb
The change in attitude of the location's elite, and their readiness to
participate in radical politics was only partially due to mounting grassroots
pressure from below. The wider currents at play had a profoundly radicalizing
effect on the classes from which the location leadership was drawn.
Throughout the 1940s, in many areas, economic pressures and the political
idealism of the war years produced a more politically aggressive outlook from
petty bourgeois Africans countrywide.19 The local Advisory Board of the
1940s, for example, was almost exclusively comprised of schoolteachers, a
social group on the Rand which had become politicised in the early war years
in the "blanket" salary campaign, conducted under the auspices of the
Transvaal African Teachers Association (TATA) of 1941 in which teachers
marched through the streets of Johannesburg in protest against their pitiful
salaries.20 Both David Bopape and Mr Nchabaleng, two prominent Advisory Board
and Vigilance Association members were TATA stalwarts on the East Rand, and it
was through the 1941 "blanket campaign", that David Bopape was first drawn
into politics, becoming a member of both the CPSA and the ANC.21 The standing
enjoyed by schoolteachers in an underprivileged community, in which education
signified the passport to upward social mobility, was a significant factur in
the growth of popular support for the Advisory Board. So too was the person.ii
charisma of leaders such as Bopape, who apart from his position on the
Transvaal ANC executive, was a much loved local figure and champion of
residents ri ghts.
The unprecedented activism of the Advisory Board and Vigilance Association in
the seeking of redress for grievances was in large measure due to the policy
and influence of the CPSA. From 1941, after a decade of decreptitude, the
CPSA underwent a remarkable recovery. The better known aspects of the CPSA's
role in these years are its involvement in white municipal politics and trade
union activity amongst African and Indian workers. Less familiar is the image
of the CPSA as an active political force in the locations of the East Kami.*2
Through its strategy of involving itself in the parochial disputes of location
residents, the Party gained widespread popularity in this region. The ("PSA
used existing location organisations, such as Advisory Boards (condemned by
the ANC Youth League at the time as collaborationist insti tut.ions) and
Vigilance Associations to establish footholds in location communities. Thus,
for the duration oi' the decade, the elected half of the Advisory Board in
Brakpan. wer« CPSA members, a situation which was mirrored in the neighbouring
town of Springs.23 In Brakpan, the communists earned themselves the support
and respect of the location dwellers by involving themseLves in local
disputes. in 194o, for example, the CPSA played a prominent role in t Jn-
dispute between the council and municipal workers over wages and over tip?
counci 1's refusal to employ Afri cans other than "reserve natives" in 11^
municipal labour force.2"1 The CPSA also intervened in campaigns against
pulice violence against residents and visiting miners patronising local
shebeens, the reintroduction of the residential permit system, the popuLari t;y
of the Ossewa Brandwag on the East Rand and the municipality's decision to
extend municj pal. passes to women.25 Another factor which enhanced the CPSA' s
Local standing was the support and legal services given to residents by the
Benonj. attorney, Lewis Baker, the CPSA blast Rand branch chairman. As a result
of the above factors, the membership of the CPSA expanded rapidly during the
war years, so much so. that the location was divided into three sections for
the sake of "organisational simplicity" .2ff
News of Brakpan was regularly reported in the pages of the CPSA newspaper,
Inkuluieko and the location was frequently visited by national CPSA f Lgurt-s
such as Edwin Mofutsanyana and Josie Palmer. Mass meetings at which such
personages spoke succeeded in attracting large audiences.2 ' J t should be
pointed out, however, that the overwhelming popularity of the CPSA arose from
its leadership's tactical acuity in mobilising residents around immediate
local concerns rather than widespread acceptance of its political philosophy
or overall strategy of transforming South African society. As one informant.
who was a member of both the CPSA and the ANC expressed it, "there was no real
spirit of communism in Brakpan". He felt that its remarkable success was due
to the failure of the other major political organisation, the ANC, to take up
local issues and to move into the political vacuum. "The ANC", he observed,
"was a bit slow. It was not acting enough, not active enough to make things
grow."25 A Youth Leaguer of the time who had grown up in Brakpan explained:
The ANC missed out a great deal because it would not interest
itself in the little things that bug the people... the
popularity of the Communist Party in Brakpan was because they
took up such things.29
Although the ANC's presence in the location in these years was negligible, a
branch had been established in the early 1920s and was not entirely inert
because it was comprised of some Advisory Board and Vigilance Assoejat.ion
members, who also belonged to the CPSA.30 But it was only after the mine
workers' strike of 1946. which swept through the mines of the East Rand, that
the ANC began actively campaigning for support in the East Rand locations. It
was at this time, that an ANC Women's League was established in the location
and that ANC mass meetings began to be staged. Until this date, the CPSA was
the undisputed political force in the region.
In 1943, as a consequence of the shift to more militant modes of organising,
the emergence of the CPSA and the intransigence and assertiveness of the
Advisory Board, the town council reappraised its entire system of control in
the Location.-3 L It was believed by councillors, that "laxity" on the part ut"
location officials had given rise to the groundswell of discontent and r.o Uie
"int'i ttration" of the Location by the CPSA.32 En this year, in the interests
of political stability, recouping the massive losses on the "native revenue
account.'1 and stream! in ing "native administration", the council established a
seperate Department of Non-European Affairs, and installed the Steilennosch
anthropologist and Ossewa Brandwag "native expert", Dr. F J Language as
Manager of Non-Eurupean Affairs.j5 Such was the zeal with which Language and
his new department set about restoring municipal control that almost
immediately, residents found themselves subjected to the ruthless overhaul of
influx controls, the intimidation of rent defaulters, the expui^ u.'ii of
residents who did not have permits to reside in the location, the-persecution
of local leaders and disruption of political meetings. ^  fhe sucidem-s-> ami
single-mindedness with which these changes were instituted ensured from the
start, that the new department and its officials would be universally loathed.
On one occasion, a "native" police spy informed the council that certain
residents had called for the "assassination" of Or Language at one of the mass
meetings. Language certainly was a controversial figure. when he engineered
the dismissal of David Bopape from his teaching post at the Amalgamated
Mission School in July, 1944, the Vigilance Association organised a schools'
boycott, and two weeks after that, a total stayaway of the entire location in
protest against this action. The central demands of the strikers were the
removal of Language from his post, the restoration of Bopape to his, and
"direct representation" of residents on the town council. The strike was
called off only after the council agreed to investigate Language7s conduct,
the possibility of reinstating Bopape and the amelioration of the abysmal
living conditions.35 Instead of fulfilling these promises, however, from this
date onwards, the council sought to tighten controls further. A ruthless
campaign to enforce the residential permit system was launched and hundreds of
rent defaulters and residents who were ineligible for permits were expelled
from the location.30 Both the sense of betrayal, following the strike, and
the unsympathetic manner in which the permit system was enforced {at a time- of
acute housing shortages Reef wide) rankled with the residents.
The council further undermined its own standing by its attempts to neutar the
Advisory Board by reducing its "powers'1 and by making resprentations to this
effect to the central government's Department of Native Affairs. l\i reply to
the residents' demand for direct representation on the council, the
councillors asserted that "natives" were not sufficiently "advanced" to
participate in Western parliamentary institutions and that this "backwardness"
explained their peculiar susceptibility to communism. In the same year, 194U,
the council mounted a programme of intimidating local political leaders,07
The social worker, who was also a CPSA member, was dismissed while the
location's church ministers were threatened with evictions if they failed to
stop acting as "cats paws" ot political organisations. Despite the attacks un
location leadership from 194G to 1948, with the assistance of Lewis Baker, the
Advisory Board and Vigilance Association waged a determined campaign against:
the permit system. Both the intensity of this campaign and the intransigence
of the local Non-European Affairs Department led to the Department of Native
Affairs to intervene and to appeal to Language to adopt a more concilliatory
attitude towards permitless Africans at this time of acute Reefwide housing
shortages.39 By the end of the decade, after years of struggle against:
municipal controls and around bread-and-butter issues, both the Advisory Board
and the Vigilance Association were more combative than ever and the Council
was forced to admit that "every recrudescence of certain foreign ideologies...
is echoed on the Rand."40
The immense support for the CPSA and the intensity of the antagonism felt by
residents twoards the location administration was dramatically expressed in
the May Day protests of i960, organised by the CPSA. The planning of tiiLS
day's stayaway protests coincided with the council's reformulation of location
regulations, designed to facilitate tighter controls. Given the background wf
continual conflict between location officialdom and the residents over
restrictions and regulations, it is not surprising that tension should have
reached breaking point un May Day. 1950. Throughout the day, an enlarged
police force, called in to maintain "law and order" roamed the dusty location
streets. After an uneven 1.1 til and peaceful da\ , a crowd ul residents massed aL
the location gates at 'J.UU p.m. and when ordered i:o disperse, stood dieir
ground, hurling abuse at the policemen. Ln thu face of the threatening
a
demeanour of the crowd, the police charged, scattering it in contused flight.
In the "disturbances" which followed, three residents were injured by the
police and were taken to hospital.41 Although the council's investigations
into the day's clashes between crowd and police placed the proverbial
"anti-social fringe" at the forefront of the flare up of rioting, there is
little corroborative evidence. The response of the crowd appears instead, to
be the culmination of the frustration and resentment which had been simmering
throughout the decade. It also stands as testimony to the CPSA ' s
organisational strength.
Yet, while the May Day protest represented the apogee of the UPSA's success on
the East Rand, it was also its swansong. In June 1950, in anticipation of the
Supression of Communism Act, the CPSA dissolved itself. Nevertheless despite
the fact that it ceased to exist as an organisation with a public identity in
several areas, and notably in Brakpan, its leaders remained politically active
in the ANC. in Brakpan, the ANC branch was to assume many of tiie
characteristics and functions of the UPSA of the 1940s over the next decade,
while the Advisory Board and Vigilance Association were to serve as important
forums of protest and organisation. To a great extent, it was because of the
organisational foundations laid by the CPSA that the ANC of the 1950s in
Brakpan was able to reorientate itself from an elitist organisation to one
with a more distinctly plebeian identity.
BRAKPAN AND URBAN APARTHEID
A further feature of Brakpan which helps to explain the coherence and
unanimity of the location dwellers' responses to the ANC, is the fact that it
remained relatively unscathed by the more drastic aspects of Verwoerdiuu
soc Lai engineering which did so much to rupture and disrupt neighbouring
African communities. Because of the local town council's failure to establish
a new "model" township, based on the Nationalist blueprint, the location
community remained intact for the decade.
By the war years, the African population was choking the location and had
spilled over into the smallholdings and backrooms of the town. The council
however, proved incapable of dealing with the housing crisis. Brakpan had
been planned originally in 1912 as a suburb of the neighbouring town of
Benoni, and hemmed in as it was by mines and mining properties, there was
simply no land available to extend the existing location or to construct a new
township.42 Moreover, the expansion of the town towards the location meant
that the existing location could not be extending without colliding with
"white1' Brakpan. As a result, all attempts at obtaining the necessary
additional land in the 194 0s came to nought.43 Nevertheless, with the
installation in 19-18 of a -government which was considerably more anxious to
bring a halt to the housing crisis in the urban areas, investigations into a
sui table s i te I'ur a new joint township with other East Rand tuuns uere
undertaken in earnest in the early 1y503. From 1951 to 1955, the council
negotiated with the Department of Native Affairs and the Mentz Commission, set
up ijy the Nationalist government to plan African housing in tiie P\s\ area, for
a suitable site for Brakpan. The Mentz Commission recommended the
const rue t Lori of a joint township for Nigel and Springs on Liiu Uirms
V lukfoni.e in no. I and no. B, which bordered on Springs1 newly t!e\ triujjed Ki-a-
Thoma township.'14 But, these plans were thwarted by Llic Brukpan luwn
Counci.I'a implaucabit; upposi tion to the "Greater Kwa Thema" scheme. The siLe
bordered on the uithok smallholdings within the Brakpan municipal- arc.-i where
the white inhabitants were strongly antipathetic to die estubiisnment of an
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adjacent At'rican township.45 Local industrialists were also opposed to the
site on the- grounds of its remoteness from the industrial areas of tiie town.
Indeed, many councillors themselves fuared that the proposed Nigel and Brakpan
townships at Vlakfontei n would eventualiy merge and isolate Biakpan from
Nigel, Dunotter and the entire south-eastern Transvaal and would constitute ;i
major "black spot" in a white urban area. They also argued that the priie-
asked for the Land at V Lakfontein was prohibitively high and that in the
absence oi railway facilities between Brakpan and Viaklontein, it v>ould be
impossible to "keep Africans off the .National Road".10 Eventually, however,
after protracted negotiations, the combined pressure oi' local industrialists
who were later prepared to abandon their earlier reservations about the SLte-
as well as the pragmatic arguments of L)r Language in support of the scheme,
the council agreed to establish a township at Vlakfontein.17 fhe change of
heart on the part of industrialists and Or Language followed close on the
heels of Dr Verwoerd's injuction that no industrial development should occur
in Brakpan until such time as conditions for "orderly settlement" at
Vlakfontei u had been achieved. Negotiations with the owners of I. he
Vlakfontein farms were duly entered into in October 1956, but because of
complicated and protracted issues concerning the railways and electricity
department, it was only in May 1939 that the first permanent houses were
completed and that the Advisory Board could congratulate the council on the
"expeditious manner in which the establishment of Tsaka.no was carried out''."1^
Although settlement at Tsakane actually began in 1957 on a "site and service"
basis to provide relief to the squatting crisis on the smallholdings, it was
not before the early 1960s that removals from the "old location" to Tsakane
began on a systematic basis. The delays in executing urban apartheid made
Brakpan unique on the East Hand. The destruction of inner city locations and
the resettlement of other East Rand African communities in large, austere,
ethnically zoned townships not only ripped apart social and po Li t teal
networks, but speeded up the process of social differentiation as new openings
for entrepreneurs and clerks became available in expanded township
administrative structures. The sheer size of these new townships, the
fragmentation of old communities, and the fact that their original inhabi luiiLs
(squattex'S, ex-miners and new arrivals) were, to a great extent, impervious to
the predominantly urban image and message of the ANG, inhibited African
politicians from organising truly mass political campaigns in this decade.
Thus, at the moment that classrooms stood empty in Brakpan during the Bantu
Education boycott in 1y55, the schools in Benoni's new township of Daveyton
were packed. Similarly, in the women's anti-pass campaign of 1956, in which 2
000 African women in Brakpan participated, the women of Daveyton broke rank.19
The stay of execution or moratorium enjoyed by Brakpan's residents, allowed
for a greater degree of internal cohesion. This factor, combined with a
heritage of popular radicalism and strong organisation goes considerable *a>
in explaining the robustness and vigour of Brakpan's African political pro tea!
in t.lie decade.
UNEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY AND CONDITIONS IN THE BKAKPAN LOCATION 19.:>0 -19f.S
Unemployment was a consistent feature in Brakpan and contributed in no small
way to the instability ami insecurity <->L urban existence. To some e\tcnt, the
per1, as i veil ess of u u employ raon t, can be explained by the small size of tin/
industrial and commercial sectors and then1 conseviuent aoility to absorb on i y
a .!. imi Led part of the deluge o f Af r i can worksuekers. Morco\ er , bo lui 11
hearted were I. IK,- UOUIICI I' s at tempts to promote indus Lr i.al i siitiou that. Wy 1 !-,'.",.">.
there were still vacant sites at Vuicania Extension no. 1. Verwoerd's refusal
to permi t. the proc Lamat ion of the uidustr la i. area, Vulcania no. 2 iint. L I. the
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counc i I had provided for the hous ing of the expected new IndustrLa.I
proletariat also impeded industrial growth in Brakpan.30 Such factories as
there were, were themselves extremely small, undercapitalised and had limit.<•<)
labour requirements. The engineering factories, for example, employed African
workforces of between 10 and 50 workers. In addition, there was an ux lrt:nn--'I y
small labour turnover in these concerns, and throughout the lyOOs, man>
I'ac tory owners boas ted of the stabi 1 i ty and long service of tht; i. r ! abuti r
forces.31 There were, therefore, rarely vacancies in the engiiiftrr i n^ and
pattern workshops of the town. Indeed, the bulk of the male African
populat ion worked as domestic servants, messengers, for the municipali Ly, in
the shops and in I;he building related concerns. Bui here Lou, new employment
opportunities were circumscribed in the ly50s. The municipal labour force was
drawn almost exclusively from "reserve natives'1 who the council believed wtrrt;
considerably more biddable than their urban counterparts, while, following the
decline of mining on the East Rand in the mid 1950s and the large scale
movement of the white mining population to the burgeoning gold fields of the
Orange Free State, the commercial, domestic service and building sectors .til
began to contract. By the late 1950s, many pessimistic observers preciiced
that Brakpan was well on its way to becoming a ''ghost town",32 The following
Lable shows how the local economic downturn of the late 1950s limited the
amount of urban employment available to local Africans and to newcomers.
VACANCIES
Agriculture
Factories
Building industry
Commerce
Hotels, Flats, Boarding Houses
Domestic Service
TOTAL :
102
2
1
26
4
6
146
Source : - BMA : BMR 14/1/30 - I n spec t ion of the Local Labour Bureaux,
Brakpan, ^8 September, 1957.
Krom the mid-1950s, with both the d e c l i n e in bu i ld ing a c t i v i t i e s (whicn had
p r e v i o u s l y been a b l e t o p e r i o d i c a l l y soak up t h e u n e m p l o y e d ) and t h e
re t renchments from the mines, the number of unemployed African men in Brakpan
was ever on the i n c r e a s e . To make ma t t e r s worse, the counc i l found i t s e l f
incapable of dea l ing with the problem and in 1957 came under f i r e from Llic1
government for al lowing " i d l e and u n d e s i r a b l e " elements to remain in the urban
a r e a . 3 3 Not only did the high r a t e of unemployment lead to the rusurgunci: of
the i n fo rma l s e c t o r ( l i q u o r r u n n i n g , dagga smuggl ing , hawking and p e t t y
t h e f t ) b u t i t saw t h e i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of h a r d c r i m e . More d a r i n g
house-breaking escapades were undertaken in the white town and sma l lho ld ings ,
but much of the c r imina l a c t i v i t y of the decade turned in upon the loca t Ion
i t s e l f . "Tso ts i 1 1 gangs of t h e " i d l e and unemployed" were i n v a r i a b l y held
r e s p o n s i b i e . i f t h e " U o t s i " g a n g s w e r e f e a r e d by i s o l a t e d w h i t e
s m a l l h o l d e r s , the;, were r e g a r d e d by t h e l o c a t i o n d w e l l e r s as a h ighlv
dangerous and d i s r u p t i v e fo rce . The increase in robbery, rape and v io lence in
the l o c a t i o n "by some t s o t s i e l e m e n t s . . . e s p e c i a l l y on t h e weekends on
l a w - a b i d i n g c i t i z e n s " was noted wiLh a la rm by the Advisory B o a r d . ' 1 Tin.-
problem of unemployment was p a r t i c u l a r l y pronounced amongst the l o c a t i o n ' s
youth, and con t r ibu ted to the c r e a t i o n of a d i s t i n c t youth s u b c u l t u r e . "lutitli
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unemployment and juvenile delinquency nad become an issue of concern for
community leaders since the late 1940s and in their annual report in 19-18, the
Advisory Board Identified a "recalcitrant youth section" in the location.3:
The council had similarly become aware in the late 1940s of the "emergence of
a young generation of irresponsible Bant us who refuse to attend school ur work
and who pass the- t Line in idleness, gambling and mischief to the detriment of
the community". "in the urban atmosphere", wrote Dr Language, "the yuuf.h
tended to evade parental controls and to develop a work-sh> complex".SG \et,
as closer scrutiny indicates, the rout of this phenomenon was far mure
profound than the "urban atmosphere". Vuuth unemployment and juvenile
de I. inquuncy arose for a number of reasons. Not only were there scant openings
in formal employment, but, as the labour bureaux inspector commented, there
was "little scope for youth in commerce and industry".37 in part, the absence
of opportunities for young people was due to the wariness of local employers
of engaging juvenile employees. Township youth was regarded as undisciplined*
unreliable, dishonest and prone to absenteeism. More importantly, as Dr
Language pointed out, it did not pay to employ juveniles "because the wage
determinations do not discriminate between the rates for juveniles and
adults".jS The attitude of the youth themselves played an important part In
creating an image of unsuiLability and irresponsibility as workers since they
generally spurned the agricultural and manual factory work offered to them by
the labour bureaux. J9 Thus, the number of unemployed youths rose yearly as
the schools disgorged school leavers who could not be absorbed in employment.
Moreover, the schools themselves proved incapable of keeping the youth
occupied. There was a severe shortage of classrooms and other educational
facilities in the location. In the absence of jobs and adequate schooling,
large numbers of bored young people whiled away their hours in the streets of
the location, and it was here, as other commentators have observed, that the
distinctive machismo youth culture, based on gambling and petty crime, was
distilled. Although the "idleness" and petty criminality was disruptive and
was viewed with alarm by location leaders, the youth were to provide an
important new political resource for the ANC in the 1950s, and as research on
youth culture and unemploent by Bonner suggests, youth culture could be a key
factor in defining the limits and possibilities of political action in the
decade.60 The almost total boycott of schools in the 1955 ANC Bantu cducaf.mii
Boycott, in Brakpan for example, was aided by the picketting and intimidatory
practises of unemployed juveniles.01
If there was little in the way of employment for men and male juveniles, there
was virtually no work available to African women. Unlike larger East Rand
towns, such as Germis ton, where the establishment of light industry had
increased the scope for female employment, outside of domestic services, the
onLy alternatives available to women were to be found in beer brewing,
prostitution and hawking. This, combined with tighter government and
munic ipaI controls upon female mobility and urban residence and the harsh
actions taken against beer brewers and female hawkers, meant that women were
extremely insecure. in 1950, a system designed to regularise the entry into
and residence of women in the urban area was introduced, while in 1 y55, the
council barred the entry of "foreign"' women into the municipal area.02 As
early as the 1930s and 1940s, a peculiarly female tradition of defensiveneso
of hume, family and school had emerged, as exemplified in widespread female
participation in subsistence campaigns, but this had tended to be episodic and
spon taneous in character. lit the considerably mure host i ie legal r.-nv i ronmen t.
of the 1950s and in a context In which marriages were proving to be
increasingly friable, "•omen were drawn in to national poli tical organ i sat..tuns
like the ANC on an unprecendented scale while their growing sense oi
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bitterness and urgency was to spill over into the communal and political
campaigns oi' the day.
Perhaps the most striking feature of life in the location was the extreme
depth uf poverty. Not only did migraiiey and the wage patterns set by the
mining industry depress wages, but these also declined in real terms in the
1950s, in u South African Institute of Race Relations (SA1KK) survey oi: 1950,
the average f am ily income in Reef towns was estimated at lii. tis. lid. it wab
broken down as follows:
Man's average wage
Wife's net contribution
Children
Total
Whi le these figures represent an increase of 31% on the 194-1 figures, t. he
minimum essential expenditure was calculated at 1.18s.6d per month. Four
years later, the SA1RR investigated the cost of living for African families in
Johannesburg, and concluded that the gap between African family incomes and
basic subsistence needs identified in 1950 had not displayed an.\ signs of
diminishing. Whereas income, including the basic wages had increased by 24%
since 1950, the cost of the barest essentials estimated as necessary for
African needs had risen by 32%. The cost of minimum food requirements had
risen by 29% since 1950 (absorbing the equivalent of 94% of the family income)
while the cost of men's clothing had increased by 84%.G3 In the absence of
ev idencc regarding wage rates and the cost of living in Brakpan, these
estimates can only be taken as approximate. It is likely that, as in the
1930s and 1940s, the wage rate in Brakpan was considerably lower than that
elsewhere on the Reef, as labour was in such abundance and as there were no
trade unions capable of securing modest increases. The general economic
piight of residen ts was eloquent Ly expressed in 1952 in an Adv isory Board
request, to the council to refrain from increasing the rentals.
In this urban existence, economic privation has all along been
at the basis of the African family's disintegration with the
most adverse social and moral effects. Malnutrition and
reduced resistance to infectious disease, coupled with
ignorance as to the importance of basic hygenic rules of
living, are the most serious threat to the African community
of today. ... the cost of living is today much higher than it
has ever been before, while the African's wage level is too
low to enable him to maintain a decent and coherent standard
of living. The introduction of higher rentals will have the
effect of hastening the further economic, social and moral
deterioration of the African family.64
VhtMi situated within this world of progressive immiseratiun, the constant
ferment around increases in bus fares and rents, the expensiveness of
municipally brewed beer and police raids on shebeens in tin-* 1950s is readily
understandable, and IL was the ability of the ANC poll ticians to tap this
reservoir uf discontent which explains much of its success in building up ;t
mass base in the location in the 1950s. indeed, as with the CPSA before them,
their attraction and strength lay riot in their overall political progi ainme,
but in their role as organisers of local opposition to municipal controls and
as champions of the fast eroding "rights" of location residents.
The slow ing rale of economic growth and the soaring cost of liv Lug ;ii;.u
affected the better educated, skilled and professional Africans. However,
they were moat directly affected by a further set of circumstances - tin-
restrictions on entrepreneurial and professional opportunities. Although tin:
population increased and although the numbers of the self employed (artisans,
craftsmen, herbalists etc) grew commeiisurately, the council refused to make
additional provision for shops and outlawed trading at the beer ha L .1 .
Consequently, artisans, petty traders and craftsmen felt thwarted in their
endeavours at capital accummulation.°5 The situation for educated and
professional Africans was no better. In the previous decade, many
schoolteachers who had been obliged to teacii in neighbouring townships - given
the limited amount of schools in Brakpan - were forced to relinquish their
jobs in order to retain their residential permits in the iirakpan location.
The general lack of clerical work for educated Africans was compounded by the
discriminatory employment practises of the municipal!ty which refused U>
employ African clerks in the location's administrative structures.
Professionals and trained persons such as teachers, the librarian and social
workers all complained bitterly of inadequate salaries, while African nurses
at the Far East Rand Hospital objected to the simplified syllabuses with which
they were trained.66 In addition to the economic constraints on their
advancement and actualization as a class, the petty bourgeois inhabitants of
the location bridled at the council's increasingly stringent administration oi'
the location. S Luce the 1940s, they felt that instead of "foster( ing)
proprietary rights, self reliance and self achievement" (classic African
middle class values), the council's policies stifled such aspirations ami
nurtured a "spirit of servile dependence". This, they could not but
"deprecate and condemn as aimed at oppression and exploitation."67
Thus, despite the potential lines of class cleavage in the location, the smaJ1
size of the petty bourgeoisie*, the assaults upon their social aspirations and
mobility and the unconcern of the local authority over the extent to which it
alienated them, meant that the location's middle class leaders were remarkabl>
receptive to the cares and concerns of the least privileged members of the
location. Indeed, there were vast areas of shared experience with their
working class neighbours: there was no separate area for "better class
natives" in this location, and in most families, petty bourgeois and working
class alike, one or more of the householders engaged in informal sector
activity.
Apart from the all-pervasive poverty an additional strain on urban life was
caused by the acute housing shortage which had surfaced in the previous decade
and about which precious little had been done. Although the council had
converted the Apex Cuai Mine compound into a hostel for single men in 1952,
and although JOO ne^ houses were completed in 195-4, the council was never able
to redress the housing shortage.6S By 1959, 12 000 people lived in the
location in an area designed to accommodate a considerably smaller population.
in this situation, 2 000 lodger families were crammed into the matchbox houses
of permit holders. Some si Le owners permitted their tenants tu construct
shacks in their back yards and tiiis inevitably multiplied existing problems
over water supply, sanitation and domestic artisan and craft i ndusLry.(> • The
admission of lodgers also placed addi tiunai stresses on wliat were aireadx
frag lie famx ly structures. The impecunious ness of tiie munic i pai i ty (which
derived little of tin.; wealth generaLeU b> the gold mining industry) meant Lhat
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Llie council was prepared to provide oniy the barest essentials necessary for
the reproduction oi' their African labour force. The localiuii eonsequen t iy
became mure squalid and depressed than ever. It stood in striking contrast to
Lht-; iiei> townships mushrooming ail over the Reef, which although
architecturally stark and representing ;i loss of the neighbourlinuss of the
"old location", showed a dramatic improvement in physical 1i v ing condi i.ions.
The Brakpan location stood as a shabby relic of an earlier age of township
planning and an age of a relatively more leisurely pace of urbanisation.
Kackrenting and overcrowd ing led to the creation of slum areas, while tin-
'backward and uuhealthy" "bucket system" was lieId responsible by residents for
tlio prevalence of disease.'0
Not (JIII> did residents live in squalor but facilities such as transport were
grossly inadequate to the community's needs. Although the location was
situated nearer to the industrial areas than the new townships, bus fares were
high and drove remorselessly into delicate household economies. Bus accidents
were frequest: there were no buses travelling to and from the location after
10 p.m. and "bad relationships" prevailed between white bus drivers and
location dwellers.7l At the same time, location residents were subjected to
tighter legal controls and restrictions on their freedoms of choice and
movement. This was most marked after 1953, when the National isL government
consolidated its parliamentary strength. From this date, the pace of social
restructuring accelerated and measures enacted by the previous parliament were
implemented with greater alacrity. This new edifice of laws was bolstered by
an armoury of local government regulations, the aim of which was to contain
political organisation and to freeze further urbanisation. In 1950, a fresh
set of regulations with tighter provisions with regard to trading, the keeping
of animals, the entry of non-residents and residential rights were
promulgated. In addition, from this time onwards, the council refused to
register workseekers who were in arrears wiLli their poll taxes and they
expelled old people whose tax indemnities indicated that they came from areas
outside of Brakpan.72 The Advisory Boaard was appalled at the regulations
which seemed to fly in the face of their appeal that the amendments be
promulgated "in accordance with the principles of justice and equity" and that
''they respect the iudi\idual's sanctity and the family's right to liberty and
privacy".73
"The new regulations'1, warned the Advisory Board in 1950, "are, in the main,
retrogressive, oppressive and exacting in nature and the greatest regret of
the Advisory board is that they will eventually invariably have the most
harmful effects on the relationships between black and white". As the
Advisory Board predicted, the inflexibility and insensitivity with which the
regulations were framed and later implemented, exacerbated the tensions
existing between officialdom and the location dwellers.
Although the regulations were declared ultra vires in court in mid-iyOl, the
amendments of 1952 were no less "oppressive and exacting" in nature. Between
September 1930 and November 1952, 3 429 residents were prosecuted b,\ the
council [.'or contravening the regulations."'1 Moreover, the regulations wore
brutali\ enforced by "blackjacks" (African municipal policemen), who
tyranni sed the Location. "Black j acks" raided beer brewers .uid the m m ' s
single quarters and these imariably violent instrusions were- .justified, by the
council, as necessary to "maintain order and moral inttgr 11> . "":
If;
The residents were also not able to seek redress from local officialdom, whuse
unsympathetic conduct was regular cause for complaint. In response, an
official retorted that residents bother*: officials Lor " t r iv ia l reasons".713
From the iate 1940s, the council also attempted to intimidate location
leadership and to throw i t into disarray. From 1948 onwards i t nominated UR-
more conservative location leaders to the Advisory Board and occasionally
appointed unpopular res idents . ' ' Thesu council nominees generally preached
moderation and were anxious to distance themselves from the CPSA and later1,
the ANC elected members of the Board. As the polit ical temperature of the
location rose in the early 1950s and as the polarisat ion between the two
halves of the Board became starker , the council exploited the ideo logical.
tensions in an attempt to neutralise the influence of the ANC members. In
1905, for example, the council provided the resources , protection and
propaganda for the nominated members who opposed the ANC-organised Education
Boycott.7S Beyond that, the council refused to consult the board uu major
decisions of location policy. As the Advisory Board's nominated member railed
when presented with the new regulations for their approval in 19:~JO,
The Town council liasn*t thought i t necessary to consult the
Advisory Board on basic principles in the Administration of
the location. This was brought out clearly in the town
council's intention to take over the registration of serv ice-
con t r ac t s , the establishment of a market and milk bar. In
each case, the Advisory Board was consulted merely for the
purposes of approving e s t ima ted p roposa l s and not on
principles themselves. What is going to undermine completely
the significance of consultation is the continual disregard of
the Adv isory Board's recommendations where any consultation
has been sought as shown . . . in the way the Town council
handles annual es t imates and a lso in respect of the new-
location and Village regulations which are now law.79
The cava l ie r treatment of the Board's recommendations, opinions and
representations on the res idents ' behalf engendered widespread anger and
resentment and from the counc i l ' s viewpoint proved'cuunter product ive .
Paradoxically, the Board retained i t s popular stature and was able to rally
the location community around both local and polit ical campaigns.
THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF THE ANC IN THE BRAKPAN LOCATION 1948 - 1958
Although the CPSA had been the dominant p o l i t i c a l force in the l o c a t i o n in the
1940s , t h e ANC had always m a i n t a i n e d a p r e s e n c e . Many prominent l o c a l
communists such as Uav id Bopape and Gideon Ngake were a l s o members of the .\N( .
Vet, i t was onl \ towards the end of the decade tha t i t s presence came to be
f e l t . i n t e r n a l changes w i t h i n the ANC n a t i o n a l body a t the t i m e , b rough t
about by the dominance of a younger gene ra t ion of urban-based i n t e l l i g e n t s i a
who r e j e c t e d t r a d i t i o n a l ANC c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e s t in f a v o u r of mash
p o l i t i c a l mob i l i s a t ion r e s u l t e d in a change in the ANC's p r o f i l e in many Reef
l o c a t i o n s . s o In Brakpan, t h i s was due in no smal l measure to the r o l e of
David Bopape, one of Die few ANC Youth Leaguers who was both a member of the
CPSA and who s u p p o r t e d t h e CPSA's s t r a t e g y of i n v o l v i n g t h e m s e l i u s in
p a r o c h i a l l o c a t i o n disputc-s in the 1910s . Bopape was a l s o a key naLioi ia l
f i g u r e in the ANC and was c h a i r m a n of t h e combined CPSA-A.\C a n L i - p a s s
campaigns of J 944 and 1946. which had evoked an impress ive l o c a l response in
Brakpan. In 1946, a s e r i e s of ANC mass meetings were iiosted by thu -\d\ isory
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Board and in 1948, an ANC-organised "day of prayer" was held in the location.
B> the end of the decade, although the actual membership and extent of local
support for the ANC was negligible in comparison to that of the CPSA,
residents were exposed to evocative and powerful nationalist speeches from ANC
leaders, which more explicitly than ever, linked the debilities suffered by
residents in the location to the wider world of domination and oppression in
South Africa, At one meeting in 1948, for example, an ANC spokesman addressed
his audience thus:
The Africans are the underdogs of ail underdogs in South
Africa. The discrimination and restrictions as well as
humiliations against them should challenge them to rise as oil-
man in a campaign to remove all their disabilities. All other
race and national groups, with their friends. . . are fi git Ling
for freedom ... The time lias come that all self respecting
African men and women must join in the struggle for their own
liberation. All liberty loving people, men and women of
goodwill of all races must join this struggle.Si
Tims, by the time the CPSA was banned in 1950, there was a strong enough
nucleus of ANC supporters in the location around which the local branch could
be built. The communist Advisory Board and Vigilance Association members
remained politically active, and from 1951, used these tenant bodies t.u
campaign for membershp of the ANC. The secretary of the ANC branch, Gideon
Ngake for example, used the Advisory Board "Report Back" meetings as a means
of campaigning for the Defiance Campaign in 1952.S2 Thus, while 1951 and the
first half of 1952 saw the national ANC body retreating from poll tica.l
activity and into a series of debates and planning sessions63, the Brakpan ANC
branch was gradually built up by the elected Advisory Board members and the
Vigilance Association which continued to organise around, and to champion the
local grievances. There was no siiortage of local dissatisfaction to fuel this
drive. The frustrations and bitterness the municipal regulations brought in
their train were compounded by intense dissatisfaction with the detenoraLion
of location facilities and the proposed hiking of location rentals. 6 1
Although an Advisory board appeal succeeded in staving off the rent increase,
the council paid little attention to the bulk of complaints and demands of the
residents. As a result, relations between the location dwellers and the Local
authority readied a new low in 1951. Contrary to the council's assurance to
the Secretary of Native Affairs (who was anxious to see "the restoration uf
goodw ili between location authorities and location dwellers") that if enjoyed
close contact with the residents and their representatives, the Lens ion
between residents and the location authorities remained acute.
While much of this was expressed in informal and inchoate fashion, such as the
regular brushes between residents and the police and with local officialdom,
the Advisory board chambers resounded with attacks and counter-attacks i;etv.eeii
the Board and council. At almost every meeting held in 1951, Board members
railed against the counciL's unsympathetic attitude towards Lhe I. jcatiun
dwellers and the obstacles it had created for newly arrived worhseekers.tj3 To
the annoyance of location officials, elected Advisory Board iiumbo rs
accompanied aggrieved residents to Lhe office of the location superintendent
to lodge complain tb. So taxed was the patience of this oil Lciai i,y this
practise, that, uii one such occasion, he ordered an elected Ad\i:ior; Board
member out oL' liib office. He later explained that while he was t.u i U- .wiling
to listen to the Board members speaking on behalf of the residents-, lie "would
not permit members just standing around like police."5G Such encoin,;...'rh acted
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as constant irritants to the raw and sensitive relations between Uhisory
Board members and the council.
Despi te the apparent in tens i ty ot* Miv isory Board opposi Lion tu the eounc L i.,
the Board was sharply divided between council nominees and the elected ANL
members throughout 19:"31 and 1952. Mule the nominated members supported liuniy
of the demands of the elected members in principle, they recoiled at the
stridency and aggressiveness with which they were made. 1'hey were
discomforted by the elected members insistence on relaying residents
grievances to council representatives at every single meeting. An irritated
nominated member, Mi' Malepe complained of the "undesirabi li ty of members
bringing up complaints of this nature as it places the Board in an invidious
position as it is manifestly impossible to decide one wa> or another."67 But
must perturbi ng for the nominated members was the lively and tumultuous
character of report back meetings and the use made by elected members of ttiis
platform, to promote the aims and programmes of the ANC. in mid-1951, the
nominated members attempted to curb the volatile mood of residents meetings by
insisting that the established practise, whereby residents elected their own
chairperson should be abolished and that only Advisory Board members should
preside over meetings in future. The resultant conflict this caused within
the Board prompted the council's intervention. From mid-1951, the council
refused to hand over the keys of the location hall to elected members for the
purposes of convening report back meetings. Yet, this tactic backfired on the
council, for rather than attend the formal report-back meetings chaired by the
unpopular nominated members, the residents increasingly flocked to the
"clandestine", informal meetings held by the elected Advisory Board members
and Vhe vigilance Association-ss
It was in this situation of tension over petty restrictions, the proposed nev.
regulations and the council's refusal to allow elected members to call and
control official report back meetings that preparation for the Defiance
Campaign was undertaken in the early months of 1952. This massive campaign of
civil disobedience has been discussed extensively elsewhere and requires no
further reiteration here. Although it is unclear as to the numbers and
precise? social nature of Brakpan volunteers in the Campaign, most reports notu
the ebullience and triumphant mood of the campaign and the prominence of women
amongst the volunteers. As in most other Reef centres, in July August, and
September of 1952, residents broke the curfew laws and regulations, cheered
volunteers from other centres who entered the location without permits, packed
the magistrate's courts when protestors were tried and marched through the
streets of the Location, and, on one occasion, the streets of the white town,
singing the ANC anthem.59 Unwittingly, the council spurred on the Campaign in
August when they dismissed Gideon Ngake, the Defiance Campaign organise;' from
the Advisory Board. A conflict between Ngake and the council iiad been
threatening since the council presented amended location regulations to i.ht;
Board for ratification in 1^52 and had refused to accede to the elected
members request for an interpreter for the Board. When Ngake objected to Lh«?
''irregular lines'' along which Advisorv Board meetings were run and stormed out
of an Advisory Board meeting in disgust, the council seized the opportunity lo
expw1 thei r most "truculent" and "arrogant" opponent from the Board. 1 n
protest, the two remaining elected members resigned, claiming that without
Ngake, the board was no longer representative of the local community.
Consequently, the council decided to suspend I.lie Board fur the remainder jl
the year and to abandon the pretence of consultation with location Leadership
over Location pui i cy . -HI mat turb c^uct* ni ing loca l ion mini in L J t r;i Lion >wij
IB
henceforth to be referred to Lhe local Non-European Affairs Depar LmenL.30 As
a resuiL, for Lhe remaining months of 19 jv, Lhe local ANG branch became the
1 ocaLiun ' s cent re of organisational grav i Ly. The erstwhile elee Led men; Den*
COIIL inued to organise residents meetings and i L appears that Lite redoubJ Lug oi'
Llieir efforts bore fruit in the following1 monLli. In October, tin- Local ANC
branch was ca tapul ted into national pi'ominenee when Brakpan vu tun Leers formed
the first "UNO" contingent (the first protestors after India's motion in the
LN'O General Assembly that South African should be debated). On this occasion,
the 10 o'clock curfew was defied. A week later, a further to Brak;>an
residents contravened the curfeu regulations.91
Although the Defiance Campaign petered out in the latter months of 1903 ;iml
although it failed to achieve iLs stated objectives, participation in acts of
protest had an important catalytic effect. Support for the AM. widened, as is
evidenced by Lhe overwhelming victory of Lhe three former ANC members of the
Board at Lhe polls at Lhe end of Lhe year.
For Lhe next two years, the energies of ANC organisers were absorbed in
mobi1 is ing the location community around the issues of rents, trunspurl,
police raids and ''apartheid" at the beerhall. While the struggles around beer-
brewing, Lhe beerha11 and bus fares culminated in successful and unanimous
beerliall and bus boycotts in October, 1954,93 the rents struggle proved to be
far more protracted, diffuse and inconclusive. To a certain extent, the
partial reversion to parochial issues in these years was due to the harassment
and persecution of ANC leadership both nationally and locally. David Uopape
had been arrested during the Defiance Campaign and was reincarcerated and
banned soon afterwards, while Gideon Ngake was later banned and banished from
the urban area.91 Because of the initially less overt political character of
these struggles, the nominated members were prepared to collaborate with Lheir
elected counterparts. In January 1953, for example, a combined deputation of
Advisory Board members attempted to persuade the council to disregard the
Department of Native Affairs' injuction that new rentals be calculated on the
basis of residents incomes. By the end of 19:14, as the ANC national budy
began to revive in preparation for the anti-Bantu Education and "Western
Areas" campaigns, the language of local protest was increasingly infused with
nationalist., and at Limes, anti-white rhetoric. By the end of 195-1, speakers
at meetings not only inveighed against the brutalities of the local localLUII
regime, but harangued against the Government and exhorted llieir audiences to
join the ANC in iLs struggle against the apartheid order. In December 19.J-1,
I)r Language was alerted to a rash of meetings which had taken place during the
last few months of the year and which had been addressed by "certain niembets
of Lhe Adv isory Board and African leaders from outside". As he informed Lhe
council, "natives from elsewhere" were "trying to sweep up Lhe masses u\er
grie\ances".
Some speakers have openly inci Led their hearers to acts of
violence against natives who do not support the ANC. The
location residents have been asked to defy the so-called
unjusL laws. AL meelings, certain cabinet ministers ar«
s Liiyled out for the most slanderous attacks. The Town (,'oune.L !.
and Manager uf \on-turopeun Affairs have been defamed and
clear Ly it in Lhe in Lent ion of cer Lain speakers to orea te an
anli-wliiLe feeling among the location inhabitants, h i c U
about uon- MM ropean administration art continually being
distorted and Natives are taught to distrust the town council
officials.95
Furthermore, Or Language appealed to the Department, of Native Affairs for Lite
authority t.o put "agitators ... behind bars'' and to restrict ANL" and Ad\isor>
Board repot11.-back mee t ings , but the So ere tary of Na t i ve Ai'i'.ii rs proved
unwilling to extend such powers to the Local authority. The council tiiu.-;
found iLseJf impotent in the face of tiie Intensification of political activity
in the latter months of 195-1 an early 1955.9C
THE BANTU EDUCATION BOYCOTT IN BttAKPAN, 1953
In the ANC anti-Bantu Education Boycott of 19jf>, Brakpan, along u t th Die Eat-I.
Kand towns of Gerniiston and Benoni, emerged as one of the most militant and
resilient centres of the boycott movement.97 It was also one of the Lucatiuiio
in which the ANC's conduct of the campaign was to divide and disrupt location
politics by giving rise to a vocal minority anti-ANC group.
There were many reasons why- the boycott evoked such a tumultuous response in
fJrakpan. From the start, organisers were campaigning in a community whose
experiences of success in the bus and beerhall boycotts of 1954 had generated
a mood of euphoria and sense of invincibility. By the end of 195-1, visiting
ANC personages such as Robert Resha would congratulate Brakpanners on their
participation in the rent struggles and exhort them to continue their
"struggle" by way of participation in the Bantu Education Boycott.95 The
radicalisation of schoolteachers was another crucial factor responsible for
the success of the Boycott. Teachers had been mobilised by TATA as early as
1951 around the findings of the Eiselin Commission, upon which the Bantu
Education Act was based. Indeed, as demonstrated earlier, education had been
one of the prime issues of concern amongst location residents since the early
1940s. In the latter half of that decade, the Advisory Board launched a
determined campaign for the improvement of educational facilities and for the
establishment of night schools, which, it was hoped, would go some way in
eliminating juvenile delinquency." The wholehearted involvement of homen in
the Boycott was another reason for its resillience and strength. Through the
Defiance Campaign, the boycotts of beerhall and buses and rent struggles, mur;.
women were drawn into location political life. As it was the women who were
generally at. home in the location during the day, they were able l.u
co-ordinate and orchestrate the day-to-day running of the Boycott. Apart from
the boycotting scholars themselves, the unemployed, streetwise juveniles wun-
active in sustaining the Boycott movement and the machismo culture of the
youtli was in evidence in the aggressive picketing, intimidation and incidents
of arson in the latter part of the Boycott. Indeed, the Brakpan location
community was so effectively prepared for the Boycott that when the ANC
executive decided to postpone it, considerable local discontent was unleashed.
The Local leaders, together with their Benoni counterparts resolved to abide
b> the original plan by calling school-goers out on the 12 th April, as
originally planned, in defiance of the National Executive's decision.100 Lj>
the end of the week, there were 3 000 Brakpan school-goers out of school, thej
highest figure for any single location.1Oi When Dr Verwoerd announced that
any schooichild absent from school by the 25th April wouid not receive further
education, the response was not one of abatement, but of renewed commitment to
the Boycott. Despite police action, only 40 Brakpan children returned to tho
secondary school and a handful of children to each of the primary school :->.
From this time onwards, the Boycott began to take on somewhat violent
overtones f-iien several attempts at arson occurred.
Daily, loudspeaker vans patrolled the streets of the location, caiJ. 111-4 upon
pa re 11 ts to keep thei r cliiidren at home. The spectacle of this sustained,
miLitant and mass based action profoundly disturbed the local white residents
and the councillors who saw intimidation and violence as the hallmarks of the
Campaign. The Brakpan Heraid published sensationalist and lurid dcscr 1 ptioiis
uf the protest. They painted scenes of "hundreds of children roaming the
s tree ts" , "'unruly el erne n f s and tsotsis" . "de tac lime 11 ts of buxom adult uomen
wielding buckled belts", "new teachers" with their fists thrust skywards,
bellowing cries of "Afrika'1 and hostile crowds "hissing" at the police who
stood by to "protect law-abiding natives from the threats of agitators."102
While all the council and white citizens could see In the Boycott was anarchy
and bully ing pressure tactics, this Campaign spawned one of the most organ.i sed
and effective "culture clubs" or alternative ANC schools. The Hrukpuii club
was run by a Mr Maboea, a teacher who had been dismissed as a consequence oi'
his part in the Campaign, and was widely supported by the conunun 1 ty \-h icli
provided the financial resources necessary for the running of the school.103
In fact, it was so well supported, that it endured for well over a year after
the Boycott, until it was forcibly disbanded by the council.
Ye t, if the v ibrancy and durabili ty of the boycott tes t i f it.-d to the
overwhelming support for the ANC, it was also spurred on and given its often
bitter edge by the emergence of an opposition movement. From the beginnings
of the boycott, there here parents, many of whom had been ANC supporters, who
became increasingly uneasy about this campaign because of their fears that the
ANC would not be able to deliver its promise of feasible alternative
education. As one disquieted nominated Advisory Board member informed the
Bantu World:
When the boycott started, we called on the ANC members to tell
us what the position was. We asked them what alternative
plans there were for the children. They said there were none
and they had received no instructions from the Head Office
about that yet. In the meantime, nothing would be done.104
There were also parents who informed the Brakpan Herald that they had never
understood the reasons why the ANC felt that their children should be taken
out of school in the first place. But it appears that it was really the
subsequent expulsion of student and the alleged intensification of
intimidatory tactics of "loafers" and "tsotsis" after this event which
transformed the sense of unease and disquiet into open opposition against the
ANC.105
Together with the three nominated Advisorv Board members who were rosoLutcU
opposed to the elected ANC members' promotion of the Boycott, these parents
and H handful of teachers formed a school committee and began to openly oppose
the boycott. One of the first actions taken by the school committee was to
petition V'eruoerd for a pardon for the expelled children. Soon afterwards,
tiit* school committee expanded to form the Brakpan Civic Protection Society
(BCPS! which in effect became an opposi tion "party" to the ANC and to the
elected ANC members. 1 0 0 ^hile it is difficult to discern the social
composition of the BCPS members as a group, it was chaired by a nominated
Advisory board member- and the key leadership positions were held by four
school teachers and three school pr inc i pals • These educators had initial 1.>
supported the boycott; it ^as only after they were dismissed for their parts
in the Campaign that they joined the school committee and began to oppose the
ANC.l°7
Most members oi' the BCPS justified their opposition to the ANC on the grounds
that bringing an end to the boycott has in the best interests oi' tht-ii
children. They argued that they had initially tried to oppose tin- Act through
participation in the Campaign, but that, in the face of police brutality and
government action, this battle could best, be fought within the established
structures provided for b> the Act.10S The newly formed BCPS and nominated
members submitted an application to the Department of Nati\e Affairy
requesting permission to establish and register a private school in the
location as a temporary measure until such time as the Minister was prepared
to allow the banned children to resume their education.109 Both the council
and the Department welcomed this request as the BCPS's actions were seen as a
means of driving a wedge into the boycott movement in one of its major
strongholds. The council thus made a room at the location swimming bath
available to the BCPS for the purposes of this school and pledged their
support to the Society in its task of the "reclamation of the location". The
BCPS school, however, only managed to enrol 230 students, less than half the
number of those attending the cultural club.110 This suggests that although
the BCPS may have enjoyed the patronage of the council and the government, it
was effectively insulated from the concerns and opinions of most of the
location dwellers. The disdain and active opposition of the BCPS to a
near-unanimous ANC-led bus boycott in the following year further demonstrates
this point.111 Nevertheless, despite the lack of support for the BCPS, its
very presence reflected and contributed to the discord and divisions which
manifested themselves in the location in the following years. ANC supporters,
for example, threatened BCPS members who enjoyed police protection during the
bus boycott, while the BCPS launched an equally bitter attack on tiie ANC and
their supporters.112
Although the bus boycott and Federation of South African Women's anti-pass
campaign of 1956 enjoyed widespread support, from this time onwards, community
and political campaigns were no longer characterised by the coherence,
unanimity and expansiveness of the protest movements of the early part of the
decade. Not long after becoming a genuine social movement and significant
political force in Brakpan, the ANC branch began to flounder. From the end of
1956, responses to ANC campaigns were partial and were marred by confusion and
hesitancy. To a great extent, this can be accounted for by the intimidation
of local leaders and the promulgation of local measures designed to inhibit
poiiticai organisation, notably, a renewed ban on Advisory Board report-back
meetings. Certain leaders were singled out for special attention. Mr Mahoeri,
the teacher who ran the cultural club, for example, was banished to the
"native territories".1*3 At the end of ly5G, the cultural club was the Tirol,
target of the council's offensive against the ANC. Not only had the cultural
c Lub prov ided an alternative view of reality, in itself, a profoundiy
subersive and political process, but it acted as a means of sustaining and
co-ordinating ANC action. The council was thus determined to eliminate the
club and proceeded to do so by forcing the youthful members of the club to
report to the Local labour bureaux for placement in employment. When 2:1
cultural club youths who had been prominent in the boycott refused to do so,
despite several warnings from the council and labour bureaux, 1.U of the i r
number were arrested and brought before the native commissioner's court in
December 1956.1Xi
This action was viewed by the residents as an unequivocal attempt to destroy
what remained of the Boycott movement, and at a mass meeting organised by the
parents of the youths in January, 1957, it was resolved that they would gather
at -1 o'clock that day at the office of the location superintendent to protest
against the arrests. It was also resolved that all workers would stay away
from work on the 28Lh February. On the 27th February, however, at a further
meeting, the residents decided against witholding their labour power on the
following day, but to launch another bus boycott instead. The reasons {'or
this decision are not clear. It is likely that the strike was called off
after the Department of Native Affairs announced its decision to investigate
the affair. 11;> No doubt, the widespread confusion caused by the council's ban
on meetings and the threats of intimidation undermined the confidence; -ind
resolve of the leaders. The council had intimated that firm action would be
taken in the event o£ a strike and as Dr Language made it clear, it was the
opinion of the council that,
I f any strike, demonstration or boycott is undertaken by
Brukpan natives in the near future, it will ... not be because
ten native youths were arrested but just because of the
opposition of the ANC to white authority and control.116
Whatever motivated the decision Lo call off the strike, the residents decided
that resistance Lo Lhe council's attack on the cultural club would best be
waged tlirough legal channels. On the 9th February, 1957, one of Lhe 10
juveniles who had been arrested, David Piale, was charged with contravening"
the labour bureaux regulations. Piale appealed against his conviction in the
supreme court. This resulted in the postponement of the other nine cases
pending the decision of the Piale case. The case assumed the importance of a
test case and its outcome was anticipated with keen interest by boLh the
council and residents. The council alerted both the Department of Native
Affairs and the Attorney General to the importance of the case.117
While the issue was fought out in court, the anger and frustration whicii
followed the cancellation of the strike erupted in a spontaneous demonsLruLiun
in Lhe location sLreeLs. On the 25Lh March, a group of women and youths
gathered around the secondary school buildings and hurled stones at the school
and at certain homes of the school. The police were summoned to quell this
upsurge and two residents were arrested.11&
On Lhf 23rd April, the judge president of the Transvaal Provincial Division of
Lhe supreme court dismissed Lhe Piale appeal and refused Lo consider an
application for leave Lo appeal. This legal victory in turn opened Lhe
comici1's way for the prosecution of the other 9 youths and for the
dismantling of the cultural club.li9 The successful first round of the
council's offensive againsL political organisation, combined with with the
bans on meetings and the "endorsing out" of residents from the location,
probably explains the lukewarm response of the local women Lo Lhe anti-pass
campaign of L958 and Lhe chaotic, confused conduct of Liie anti-rtuito increase
struggles of 1958 and 1959. NoL only was Lhe latter campaign hampered by
direct harassment, but, because of Lhe absence of meetings, uo clear sLraU-:gy
could be communicated to Lhe residents. The campaign was also fraughL with
uiLernaJ dissension. Although ideological and sLraLegic differences between
the \igilance Association and Liic BCPS were submerged in a "genL leman' s
agreement" tw ensure Lhat Lhe Advisory Board of 195 7 was retained for Lhe
foi lowing year in an LieipaLion of a full-seaJe campaign against Lhe rent
increase
 t a faction opposing L h e elected Ad v i so r y Boa r d mad e i. t. s
•> x
appearance. 1 2 0 This grouping was led by Mr Namo, an AMJ member, who opposed
the A.NC's advice Lo residents to pay the new rentals "under protest" pending
UR 1 outcome of an appeal case oi' Johannesburg residents contesting the legal
standing oi' the increase in favour of an all-out boycott.iZJ The confusion
caused by the emergence of rival poles of allegiance and the elaboration oi'
competing strategies was heightened by the council's threat to instruct
employers to deduct 25!£ off wages in order to cover the rents arrears. By the
end of 1958, clarity had still not been reached. Many residents refused to
fill out the income assessment forms or to pay the new rents, while others,
following the advice of the Advisory Board, cotninued paying the rents "under
protest" . 11 was in tlii s atmosphere of confusion that the elections for tin:
Advisory Board for 1959 were held. Residents who had not paid their rentals
were barred from voting and from standing for election. This ruling prevented
men like the popular Vigilance Association secretary and veteran ANL Advisory
Board member, Mr Pakade, from contesting his "seat".122 Thus, from the start,
the Advisory Board of 1959 failed to win the trust and support of the
residents. At a rare public meeting, permitted by the council in December
1958, a vote of no confidence in the newly elected Board was taken.123
By this date, with leadership in Brakpan in disaray, the early removals of
lodgers to the site and service scheme at Tsakane was set in train and large
numbers of residents were evicted daily for failing to comply with the
residential requirements. The mood of despondency and demoralisation became
even more acute when the news broke in December that the Johannesburg rent
case had been dismissed in the supreme court with costs. The rent boycott in
Brakpan, along with other Reef townships, now cracked and thousands of tenants
streamed into the township offices requesting more time in which to pay their
arrears.12! Mot surprisingly, these developments had powerful depoliticising
effects. Thus, in April 1960, when several African townships were swept by
protest, the Brakpan Town Council could report that Africans of the town had
been "calm" and that this situation was due to the "composed and competent
guidance from the Advisory Board". The "orderly and impassive behaviour of
the Bantu people in Brakpan", the council repeatedly remarked "is acknowledged
and accredited to the sober leadership of the Advisory Board."123
This date also marked the beginnings of the decades long process of
dismemberment of the location, as section by section, neighbourhoods were
destroyed and their inhabitants were shepherded into the austere rows of
houses at Tsakane. Undoubtedly, the removals, the break up of social, and
cultural networks that this entailed, combined with the banishment of large
numbers of residents to the "native territories" or "homelands", helps explain
the political quiescence which characterised Tsakane until the early to
mid-BOs when Urakpan once again witnessed the outbreak of bus, runt and
consumer boycotts. A further explanation is the fact that the earliest
inhabitants and significant section of the population of Tsakane were
ex-miners and squatters who had lived on the vast smallholdings surrounding
the town. Not onl\ had t lie ANL" failed to intervene in and steer the
spontaneous ferment on the plots in more coherent directions in the 1950s, but
when the squatters most immediate needs were met by the state in the form of
massive housing programmes, the ex-squatters were to be the most impervious
ami complacent sections of the Tsakane population. Their passivity v.as to bo
amongst the many insuperable barriers faced b\ the ANC in the following
decade.
TABLE I
SURVEY : PRIVATE UNDERTAKINGS BY NATIVES
coal and wood traders 39
garden workers 13
bricklayers 8
boot and shoe repairers 23
tailors 9
mattress makers 9
barbers 12
hawkers 5
plumbers 4
musicians 1
cartage contractors 6
taxis 20
herbalists 2
native ornament makers 3
motor mechanics 3
makers of sjamboks 2
general dealers 10
photographers 1
painters 3
travellers 2
handymen 6
carpenters 1
watchmakers 1
skin traders 1
others 2
Source: BMA : BMR 14/10/23 - Survey of Private Undertakings oi" Natives, ]
October, 1954.
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